

Tysk-Svenska Handelskammaren | Visby/Gotland, 3rd July 2017
Almedalen Seminar


German Economy after the Election

What actions does the next German Chancellor have to take?


Prof. Dr. Stefan Kooths
Forecasting Center



The stylized picture




Chewing gum cycle



- Stretched upswing, weak cyclical pattern
- Immigration supports labor force and potential growth (refugees: large time lag)
 - » 2015: + 331.000
 - » 2016: + 511.000
 - » 2017: + 313.000
 - » 2018: + 213.000
- Capacity utilization already above normal levels

Upward capacity utilization trend

Capacity utilization in manufacturing




Quarterly data, seasonally adjusted;

Capacity utilization: axes cross at normal capacity utilization level.


- Manufacturing
 - » 5-years upward trend, above normal since three years ...
 - » ... order inflow exceeds capacities
- Construction
 - » Historically high levels
- Services
 - » Lack of demand (ifo) at lowest level since 2005
- Elastic labor market

2017 starts with strong momentum




- Shiny business climate (ifo)
 - » Composite/situation hits new record high (June 2017)
 - » Expectations above average and improving since 12 months
- Order inflow
 - » Upward trending (more than 4 years)
 - » Approaching pre-crisis peak
- Industrial production
 - » Upward trending
 - » Above pre-crisis peak
- 2017: Dampening working-day effect (0.3 ppt)

Construction activity is booming




- Capacity utilization
 - » Record high level
 - » Long-term average: 66 percent
- Order books piling up
 - » Total: + 21 % (Q4, y-o-y)
 - » Dwellings: Two-digit growth rates since 2 years
- Price pressure
 - » Value added: Upward pressure since two years
 - » Stock transactions (vdp)
 - 2014: + 3.2 %
 - 2015: + 4.5 %
 - 2016: + 6.0 %

Strong further increase in constructions




- Dwellings as key driver
 - » Extremely low financing cost
 - » Dynamic labor market
- Pro-cyclical public investment spending
- Growth contributions
 - » 2016: 0.2 ppt
 - » 2017: 0.4 ppt
 - » 2018: 0.4 ppt

Stretched upswing, dampened accelerator effects




- Overall unpronounced cyclical pattern
- Fixed capital formation responds less dynamic than usual

Spending on M&E gains momentum



- 2017
 - » Carry-over effect: - 0,9 ppt
 - » Calendar effect: - 0,9 ppt
- 2018: Exceeding pre-crisis level
- Weak cyclical pattern
- Financing
 - » Record low cost
 - » Very little restrictions
- Low market uncertainty, but increased policy uncertainty
- Harbinger of demographic change (lack of skilled labor)?


Exports back on track



- Stronger order inflow
- Foreign markets
 - » Less uncertainty
 - » Brighter business climate
- Export markets
 - » 2016: + 2.2 %
 - » 2017: + 2.6 %
 - » 2018: + 2.4 %
- Risks
 - » Brexit
 - » Neo-protectionism

Brexit: No game changer for German business cycle

Ausfuhren in das Vereinigte Königreich 2016–2018



Veränderung gegenüber dem Vorquartal in Prozent. Prognose Sommer: Juni 2016, vor Brexit-Votum, Prognose Herbst: September 2016, nach Brexit-Votum. Prognose Winter: Dezember 2016, inklusive Daten für 2016Q3.

- Country-specific export function
 - » UK-GDP
 - » Exchange rate GBP/EUR
- UK-GDP [Autumn forecast]
 - » 2016: + 2,0 % [+ 1,6 %]
 - » 2017: + 1,2 % [+ 0,6 %]
 - » 2018: + 1,6 % [+ 1,6 %]
- Strong currency revaluation:
8 + 3.5 percent
- German UK exports (cumulated)
 - » 2016: – 2.2 %
 - » 2017: – 8.2 %
 - » 2018: – 10.0 %
- GDP-impact (cumulated) < 0.5 %

Transatlantic economic ties: Beyond the trade-centered debate

Fig. 1: Transatlantic trade links






Fig. 2: Transatlantic direct investment positions



Transatlantic economic ties: FDI as (some) protection against protectionism


- Bilateral trade balance
 - » EU-surplus: 115 bn. Euro
 - » Germany: 49 bn. Euro
- Export shares
 - » From EU to U.S.: 16 percent
 - » From U.S. to EU: 11 percent
- FDI positions
 - » From EU to U.S.: 32 percent
 - » **From U.S. to EU: 50 percent**

Fig. 3: Importance of the EU Market for the U.S.




Oil price weighs on consumption dynamics

Private consumption



Quarterly data, price, seasonally and calendar adjusted, qoq-change.


Contributions to change in private consumption



Annual data; disposable income including adjustment for the change in pension entitlements.


Broader picture on expenditure side of GDP

Expenditure-side components to GDP-growth



- 2015/2016 strongest consumption increase since 15 years
- Investment spending gains momentum
- Exports leave slack period behind

Revision of employment numbers, 2015-2016



- Employment
 - » 2016: + 436,000
 - » 2017: + 638,000
 - » 2018: + 533,000


- Effective wages (hourly)
 - » 2016: + 2.8 %
 - » 2017: + 3.6 %
 - » 2018: + 3.1 %

- Unemployment rate


| | |
|---------------|---------|
| » 2016: 6.1 % | [3.9 %] |
| » 2017: 5.7 % | [3.6 %] |
| » 2018: 5.4 % | [3.3 %] |
| BA | ILO |

Refugees only gradually enter the labor force



Unterbeschäftigte, arbeitslose und beschäftigte Flüchtlinge 2015-2016



Arbeitslose Flüchtlinge
(Nov 2016): 160 000



Einfluss der Flüchtlinge auf Arbeitslosigkeit und Unterbeschäftigung 2012-2016




Key figures

| | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| GDP (%) | + 1.9 | + 1.7 | + 2.0 |
| GDP deflator (%) | + 1.4 | + 1.1 | + 1.8 |
| Consumer prices (%) | + 0.5 | + 1.7 | + 1.7 |
| Unit labor cost, hourly (%) | + 1.7 | + 2.3 | + 1.7 |
| Employment (1000 persons) | 43.594 | 44.215 | 44.665 |
| Unemployment (1000 persons) | 2.689 | 2.529 | 2.424 |
| Public budget balance (% of GDP) | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Current account balance (% of BIP) | 8.5 | 7.9 | 7.8 |

Medium-term: Drifting into overheating

Production and potential output



Yearly data; GDP, Potential output: price adjusted (chain indexvolumes, 2010=100).

- Ultra-expansionary monetary policy
 - » Distortion of relative prices \Rightarrow production structures
 - Capital stock
 - Exchange rate
 - » Financial stability
 - Inadequate risk premia (“insolvency slack”, hampered structural change)
 - Overstretched maturity transformation
- Overestimating potential output
 - » Data edge problem
 - » Demographic interim high, future of refugees
- No real spirit for supply-side reforms
- Macro-management bias in EMU context
- Neo-protectionism

Post election coalition scenarios

- AfD

- CDU/CSU

- FDP

- B'90/Die Grünen

- SPD

- Die Linke

Most likely

Second likely

Third likely

Unlikely

- Social pension system: Higher expenditure
 - Social health insurance: Extension to all citizens
 - Income taxation
 - » “Solidarity surtax”: Stepwise removal (starting with lower incomes)
 - » Flattening tariff for middle-incomes, higher top-income tax rates
 - » Property income tax: Integrated into general tariff
 - » Family splitting
 - Child benefits: Graded according to household income
 - Death tax: High allowance range, all asset classes covered
 - Financial transaction tax
- ⇒ **Balanced intra-tax system modifications, but social spending hardly in line with debt break requirements**

- Relief for communities
 - » Shifting social spending to federal level
 - » Mutualizing local legacy debt via settlement fund
- Social health insurance: Extension to all citizens
- Income taxation
 - » Higher top income tax rates
 - » Higher allowance range
 - » Property income tax: Integrated into general tariff
 - » Transformation of spouse splitting into family budget
- Financial transaction tax
- Reform of death tax
- Property tax for the “super rich”
- Higher depreciation allowances for minor economic goods
- ⇒ **Property tax reform faces legal headwinds (plus high administration cost), relief for communities may stimulate public investment**

- Income taxation
 - » Shifting full tariff to the right (tax reduction: minimum 30 bn. Euro)
 - » Inflation indexing (“tariff on wheels”)
 - » Removal of “solidarity surtax”
 - Reform of death tax (lower net tax burden?)
 - Tax allowance for land transfer tax
 - Reintroduction of digressive depreciation
 - Discharge of public debt (low interest rates, inter-generational aspects)
- ⇒ **Most aggressive tax reduction ambitions of all parties, but tax plans and budgetary targets hardly achievable simultaneously**

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